

European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

Study Center Gerzensee

Monday 30 June–Friday 11 July 2008

The meeting is generously hosted by the Study Center Gerzensee

**Preliminary Programme
Draft 27/06/2008**

Week One

Monday 30 June

08:30 – 10:00

Network Games with Endogenous Communication

Antoni Calvo-Armengol

Joan de Martí Beltran (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

*Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20:30 - 21:30

Monopolistic Screening under Learning by Doing

*Dennis Gärtner (Universität Zurich)

20:30 - 21:30

Ownership and Control in Differentiated Products Markets

Heiko Karle (GESS, Universität Mannheim)

Tobias Klein (Tilburg University)

*Konrad Stahl (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)

Tuesday 1 July

08:30 – 10:00

Organize to Compete

*Ricardo Alonso (University of Southern California)

Wouter Dessein (University of Chicago, GSB and CEPR)

Niko Matouschek (Northwestern University, Kellogg and CEPR)

Special Session

15:00 – 16:30

***Information and Learning in Markets – The Impact of Market
Microstructure***

*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

- 20:00 - 21:00 ***Time-Consuming Technology Development: How Imitation and Spillovers affect Competitive Dynamics***
 Gonzalo Pacheco-de-Almeida (New York University)
 *Peter Zemsky (INSEAD and CEPR)
- 20:00 – 21:00 ***Should Speculators Be Welcomed in Auctions?***
 *Marco Pagnozzi (Università di Napoli)

Wednesday 2 July

- 08:30 – 11:30 ***Focus Session: Organization and Growth***
- Chair: Luis Garicano (London School of Economics and CEPR)
- Smithian Growth through Creative Organization***
 *Patrick Legros (ECARES and CEPR)
 Andrew F. Newman (Boston University and CEPR)
 Eugenio Proto (University of Warwick)
- Research Cycles***
 Yann Bramoullé (Laval University)
 *Gilles Saint-Paul (Toulouse, IDEI and CEPR)
- Organizing Growth***
 *Luis Garicano (London School of Economics and CEPR)
 Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (Princeton University)
- General Discussion: Organization and Growth***
 Chair: Philippe Aghion (Harvard University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

- 20:00 - 21:00 ***Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems***
 *Jakub Steiner (University of Edinburgh)
 Eugen Kovac (University of Bonn)
- 20:00 – 21:00 ***Intermediation and Investment Incentives***
 Paul Belleflamme (CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain)
 *Martin Peitz (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)

Thursday 3 July

- 08:30 – 10:00 ***The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals***
 *Heidrun Hoppe (University of Hannover and CEPR)
 Benny Modovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR)
 Aner Sela (Ben Gurion University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

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| 20:30 - 21:30 | <i>Organizational Design and Environmental Volatility</i>
Heikki Rantakari (University of Southern California) |
| 20:30 - 21:30 | Efficient Repeated Implementation
Jihong Lee (Birkbeck College, London and Yonsei University)
*Hamid Sabourian (University of Cambridge and CEPR) |

Friday 4 July

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| 08:30 – 10:00 | <i>The Organization of Search for Innovations</i>
*Tracy Lewis (Fuqua, Duke University)
Marco Ottaviani (Northwestern University, Kellogg and CEPR) |
| 10:00 – 10:30 | Break |

Morning Parallel Sessions:

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| 10:30 - 11:30 | <i>R&D Competition and Strategic Trade Restrictions in the Market for Technology</i>
*Patrick Herbst (Goethe University Frankfurt)
Eric Jahn (Goethe University Frankfurt) |
| 10:30 - 11:30 | Foundations of Strategic Epidemiology: Recurrent Infection and Treatment
Flavio Toxvaerd (University of Cambridge and CEPR) |

Week Two

Monday 7 July

08:30 – 10:00

Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing

Kfir Eliaz (Brown University and CEPR)

*Rani Spiegler (University College London and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Preference for Similarity and Information Collection in Groups

*Mariagiovanna Baccara (Stern, New York University)

Leeat Yariv (Caltech)

20:30 - 21:30

Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach

*Alex Gershkov (University of Bonn)

Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR)

Tuesday 8 July

08:30 – 10:00

Reputation Games with Finite Automata

*Andrea Wilson (New York University)

Mehmet Ekmekci (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks

*Adam Szeidl (University of California - Berkeley)

Attila Ambrus (Harvard University)

Markus Mobius (Harvard University)

20:30 - 21:30

Negatively Correlated Bandits

*Sven Rady (University of Munich and CEPR)

Nicolas Klein (University of Munich)

Wednesday 9 July

08:30 – 11:30

Focus Session: Contracts and Rationality

Chair: Patrick Bolton (Columbia University and CEPR)

Complexity and Contracts

*Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)

Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Satisficing Contracts

*Patrick Bolton (Columbia University and CEPR)

Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Loopholes: Social Learning and the Evolution of Contracts

*Andrew F. Newman (Boston University and CEPR)

Philippe Jehiel (PSE, University College London and CEPR)

Incentives for Unaware Agents

*Ernst-Ludwig von Tadden (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)

Xiaojian Zhao (Universität Mannheim)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Contractual Enforcement and Strategic Incompleteness

*Roberta Dessi (University of Toulouse and CEPR)

20:30 - 21:30

Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents

* Florian Englmaier (Universität Muenchen)

Steve Leider (Harvard University)

Thursday 10 July

08:30 – 10:00

Narrow Bracketing and Dominated Choices

Matthew Rabin (University of California – Berkeley)

*Georg Weizsäcker (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions:

20:30 - 21:30

Overconfidence and Career Concerns in a Dynamic Model with Complete Contracts

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University College London and CEPR)

Francesco Squintani (University of Essex)

20:30 - 21:30

Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision

Florian Ederer (MIT)

Richard Holden (Sloan, MIT)

*Margaret Meyer (Nuffield College, University of Oxford and CEPR)

Friday 11 July

08:30 – 10:00 ***Testing Theories with Learnable and Predictive Representations***
 *Nabil Al-Najjar (Kellogg, Northwestern University)
 Alvaro Sandroni (University of Pennsylvania)
 Rann Smorodinsky (Technion, Haifa)
 Jonathan Weinstein (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

10:00 – 10:30 Break

Morning Parallel Sessions:

10.30 – 11.30 ***Incomplete Language as an Incentive Device***
 *Deszö Szalay (University of Warwick)
 Péter Esö (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

10.30 – 11.30 ***Williamson Meets Hart: Opportunism and Incomplete Contracts***
 *Pablo Casas-Arce (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
 Thomas Kittsteiner (London School of Economics)

Asterisks (*) denote authors who are present at the meetings.

Organizers: Philippe Bacchetta (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)
 Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
 Matthew O. Jackson (Caltech California Inst. of Technology)
 Margaret A. Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford University and CEPR)
 Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)
 Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)
 Rani Spiegler (University College London and CEPR)
 Juuso Välimäki (HSE, University of Southampton and CEPR)
 Tim Van Zandt (INSEAD and CEPR)
 Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)
 Lucy White (Harvard Business School, Université de Lausanne and CEPR)