



European Summer Symposion in Economic Theory

Gerzensee, 30 June - 11 July

Revised Programme as of 7 July

Monday 30 June Half-Day Workshop on 'Experimental Economics'

Workshop leader: Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

8.30 - 12.00 **Using Learning Models to Predict Behaviour**
Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

**Cooperation, Emotion, and Punishment: An Experimental Analysis of
Norm Formation and Enforcement**
Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)

20.30 - 21.30 **On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The
Cognitive Game Theory Approach**
Ido Erev (University of Pittsburgh)

Tuesday 1 July

8.30 - 9.45 **Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid? An Experimental
Investigation into Tax Equivalence**
Rudolf Kerschbamer (Universität Wien)
Georg Kirchsteiger (CentER, Tilburg University)

10.15 - 11.15 **Experimental Results on the Centipede Game in Normal Form: An
Investigation on Learning**
Rosemarie Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
Fang-Fang Tang (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

20.30 - 21.30 **A Simple Test of Explanations for Contributions in Dilemma Games**
Gary Bolton (Pennsylvania State University)
Jordi Brandts (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CISIC), Barcelona)
Elena Katok (Pennsylvania State University)

Wishful Thinking and Strategic Ignorance
Juan Carrillo (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles)
Thomas Mariotti (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)

Wednesday 2 July Half-Day Workshop on 'Matching'

Workshop leader: Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

8.30 - 12.00 **Introduction to Two-Sided Matching Markets and Models**
Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment
John Kagel (University of Pittsburgh)

Unravelling and Capacity Withholding in Two-sided Matching Markets
Tayfun Sönmez (University of Michigan)

Some Engineering Aspects of Mechanism Design: The Redesign of the American Clearinghouse for New Physicians
Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

20.30 - 21.30 **Evolution, Preferences, and Choice under Uncertainty**
David Canning (The Queen's University of Belfast)

Subjective Randomness and Point of View in Hide-and-Seek Games
Peter Ayton (City University Business School)
Ruma Falk (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Thursday 3 July

8.30 - 9.45 **The Generalized War of Attrition**
Jeremy Bulow (Stanford University)
Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford and CEPR)

10.15 - 11.15 **The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games**
Iris Bohnet (Universität Zürich)
Bruno S. Frey (Universität Zürich)

20.30 - 21.30 **Strategic Complementarity, Bounded Rationality and the Non-Neutrality of Money**
Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Universität Zürich)

Repeated Games and Limited Forecasting
Philippe Jehiel (Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussée, CERAS, Paris and CEPR)

Friday 4 July

- 8.30 - 9.45 **ERC. A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition**
Gary Bolton (Pennsylvania State University)
Axel Ockenfels (Universität Magdeburg)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies**
Winand Emons (University Bern and CEPR)
- On the Effects of the Pricing Rule in Auction and Fair Division Games -
An Experimental Study**
Werner Güth (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Monday 7 July

- 8.30 - 9.45 **Reputation or Reciprocity?**
Armin Falk (Universität Zürich)
Simon Gächter (Universität Zürich)
Judith Kovacs (University of Debrecen, Hungary)
- 10.15 - 11.15 **Levels of Reasoning in Guessing Games
- An Experimental Study -**
Rosemarie Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Post-Trade Transparency in Multiple Dealer with Financial Markets**
Mark D Flood (Concordia University, Montreal)
Ronald Huisman (Universiteit van Limburg, Maastricht)
Keens Koedijk (Univeriteit van Limburg, Maastricht)
Ronald J Mahieu (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
Ailsa A Röell (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and CEPR)
- Evolving Social Hierarchies in Large Population Games**
Fernando Vega-Redondo (Universidad de Alicante)

Tuesday 8 July Half-Day Workshop on 'The Psychology of Preference'

Workshop leaders: Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

8.30 - 12.00 **The Psychology of Preference: Mental Accounting**
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)

Behavioural Finance
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

20.30 - 21.30 **The Dutch Construction Cartel**
Eric van Damme (CentER, Tilburg University)

Misperceptions, Heterogeneity, and Shared Knowledge
José V. Rodríguez Mora (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)

Wednesday 9 July

8.30 - 9.45 **Rational Social Learning with Random Sampling**
Lones Smith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Peter Sørensen (Nuffield College, Oxford)

10.15 - 11.15 **Arbitrage Exploitation in a Simple Option Pricing Experiment**
Bettina Kuon (Universität Bonn)

20.30 - 21.30 **Hyperbolic Discount Functions and Time Preference Heterogeneity**
David Laibson (Harvard University)

Thursday 10 July Half-Day Workshop on 'Intertemporal Choice and Behavioural Game Theory'

Workshop leaders: Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

8.30 - 12.00 **Intertemporal Choice, Emotion and the Brain**
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)

Behavioural Game Theory
Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)

20.30 - 21.30 **How to Account for Fair and Unfair Outcomes - A Model of Biased Inequality Aversion**
Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)
Klaus Schmidt (Universität München and CEPR)

The Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem: First-Best Risk Sharing Contracts and their Decentralization
Christopher Harris (University of Cambridge)
Patrick Bolton (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Friday 11 July

8.30 - 9.45 **Home Bias in International Stock Return Expectations**
Michael Kilka (Universität Mannheim)
Martin Weber (Universität Mannheim)